India’s SCO chairmanship and its quest in bridging trust deficit

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has developed into one of the most dynamic organisations and has the potential to alter the global geopolitical landscape by ensuring regional security and stability.

In the shadow of Narendra Modi's recent trip to the United States and the impending preparations for the G20 summit in New Delhi. On 4 July 2023, India, under its chairmanship of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), will host the annual leaders' summit virtually.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is one of the greatest emerging intergovernmental cooperations among the leading economies of Eurasia. It includes China, India, and Russia, the three dominant powers in the Asian and Eurasian region, as well as several Central Asian nations. It remains a pivotal site of convergence for Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, with Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia potentially joining it. SCO is the world's largest regional organisation in terms of area, encompassing approximately sixty percent of Eurasia, forty-two percent of the world's population, and twenty-five percent of the global gross domestic product. 25 percent of the world's oil reserves and 50 percent of natural gas and uranium deposits are held by SCO member nations.

SCO was established to debate security issues in the Eurasian region. Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) was established in 2004 to promote cooperation among member states regarding regional terrorism, ethnic separatism, and religious fundamentalism in the region. "Towards an SECURE SCO" is the theme of India's chairmanship of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Security, Economy and Trade, Connectivity, Unity, Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity, and Environment comprise the acronym SECURE.

Despite the growing importance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a forum for discussing issues pertinent to the Eurasian region, its shared objectives were tarnished by divergences and complexities. First, the SCO is primarily intended to expand the sphere of influence of the 'Big Two' (China and Russia) over the Central Asian republics. Russia intends to maintain and expand its sphere of influence in the former soviet states, also known as its "backyard." China's ambitious "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) aims to connect China with Europe and the heartland region in between; Central Asia is a crucial link in this endeavour.

Russia has agreed to safeguard the BRI and connect it to the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). In this manner, the 'limitless' partnership between China and Russia is utilised to protect their shared interests in Central Asia, which ultimately helps to diminish the influence of Western nations in the region. As the Ukraine conflict continues, India must be apprehensive about Russia's increasing dependence on China. That is, Russia's relationship with New Delhi could suffer as a result of a possible pivot towards China.

Second, the SCO's core countries in Central Asia continue to be inherently unstable and volatile. Water disputes have become a source of tension between the countries in that region, threatening regional stability and security. The prospective lack of water supply caused by dams in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan causes concern in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which are located downstream. The construction of the Rogun Dam in Tajikistan could have repercussions for Uzbekistan, which have previously contributed to deteriorating relations between the two countries. In September 2022, border confrontations erupted between two SCO members, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, resulting in the deaths of 94 citizens of the two warring nations, indicating that their friction could destabilise the entire region. Beyond the heightened tensions and instability in the Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) and the ongoing Ukraine conflict (East Europe), Russia would prefer not to see another theatre of confrontation in the Eurasian region.

India and Pakistan were granted SCO membership in 2017 in an effort to legitimise and expand the organization's influence in the south Asian region. The historical rivalry between India and Pakistan and the deteriorating relations between India and China cast a shadow over the forum's shared goals. Although SCO member nations do not discuss bilateral issues, tensions persist. This was evident in May 2023, when India hosted the foreign ministers of SCO nations in Goa. India's hostile relations with China and Pakistan were on full display.This means that no concrete measures to defuse tensions among member nations that imperil regional stability can emerge from the meeting.India is aware that its engagement with China or even Pakistan at the SCO will be multilateral, but it can use this forum to open a channel of communication to discuss outstanding issues and ensure peace and tranquilly in the border regions.

India can also use the SCO forum to diversify and intensify its engagement with Central Asian republics, which are commonly referred to as its "extended neighbourhood."In January 2022, PM Modi hosted the first-ever virtual India-Central Asia Summit with the participation of the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. As the region is abundantly endowed with commodities such as crude oil, natural gas, cotton, gold, copper, aluminium, and iron, India's 'Connect Central Asia' policy has the potential for substantial trade, investment, and economic development. To counter China's influence in the region, which is already the largest trading partner for the majority of Central Asian economies, rendering them highly reliant on Chinese trade.India must increase its influence with the Central Asian nations through 3T cooperation in trade, technology, and transportation. India could expand the 'International North–South Transport Corridor' (INSTC) that connects it to other Central Asian nations, thus gaining secure access to energy exports to satisfy its rising demand. All of these are compelling arguments for India to establish a more stable and expansive economic presence in Central Asia, so that it is not solely subject to Chinese and Russian influence.

India could utilise its SCO presidency to address two crucial issues that service its geostrategic objectives. First, investigate means to de-escalate the Ukraine conflict between Russia and the West. Second, incorporate concerns regarding China's expansionist conduct into the agenda. Both appear unlikely to be explicitly discussed. What significance does SCO have for India? This may be the reason for India's decision to transfer the summit to a virtual format, which may reflect the SCO's massive trust and credibility deficit. In spite of this, India's presence at this high table is a signal to other member states of its strategic stance in the evolving geopolitical chess game in the Eurasian theatre. Its presence also counterbalances Pakistan's membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and its expanding ties to China and the region. India must deftly leverage its relationship with Russia in order to emerge as a key actor ushering in a'rebalancing of power' in the Eurasian region.

Despite territorial disputes and their inherent strategic differences and divergences, the SCO has the potential to redraw the world order by bringing together China, India, and Russia, three economic, military, and political titans. SCO has evolved into one of the most dynamic organisations and has the potential to alter the global geopolitical landscape by ensuring regional security and stability in Eurasia.